Economists as Worldly Philosophers
The Great Economic Thinkers, Robert Heilbroner gave an inspirational account of what economists do, an account that was assigned as supplemental reading to countless beginning economics students over decades. Heilbroner wrote that he chose the term "worldly philosophers" because of the breadth and moral depth of economists' inquiry. The appellation stuck, and for many years it was common to refer to economists as worldly philosophers. The inspiration of that book has contributed to the desire for many to go on to become economists, and to productive lives as researchers.
But, while the volume of research turned out by economists is most impressive, there are questions whether "worldly" and "philosophical" are represented as much as they should be in economic research. Has economics as a profession substantially lost sight of the idealism that existed in earlier decades? Has the strong impulse to pursue narrow specialization in order to propel research to the frontier led to some loss of moral perspective?
The financial crisis that started in 2007 and that continues today is widely taken in the popular press as evidence of a lapse, moral or otherwise, in the wisdom and judgment of the economics profession. Why was it that the profession as a whole failed to anticipate and raise any significant warning about the biggest financial crisis in the better part of a century?
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At this juncture, we believe it is important to consider trends in economics over the years, and to think about factors influencing research agendas. We will start with consideration of the work of two of Heilbronner's "worldly philosophers." Overall, the men who were featured in this book and who were influential in the early development of the profession -including Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Henry George, John Maynard Keynes, Thomas Malthus, Alfred Marshall, and John Stuart Mill -were concerned with the broader intellectual current of their day, and were involved in important public policy issues with relevance to bettering the lives of citizens. They conceived of their discipline more broadly, and more in terms of moral imperatives, than most economists seem to do today.
I. Examples
Adam Smith was a professor, not of economics but of moral philosophy. psychology and of the course of historical events and institutional changes that weren't captured in modern econometric models.
Narrow specialization has its distinct advantages, of course: it facilitates rapid scientific progress, at least along directions that have been indicated by earlier visionaries who did not specialize so narrowly. But a spirit of specialization in the profession has potential disadvantages as well. If specialization is too extreme, it has a tendency to lead to carrying original ideas too far, beyond their useful purpose. Specialization coupled with strong competitive pressures within academia leads to a situation in which academics often feel that they just do not have time to
ponder broad issues and learn even basic simple facts outside their specialty. Their general knowledge may be embarrassingly limited, and so they may retreat into their own specialty and produce research which contributes in small ways to the development of the field, but fails to pay attention to the larger picture.
II. A Long-Term Trend Towards Increasing Scientific Rigor and Specialization
Modern social sciences departments began to proliferate in the late 19 th century. The
Baltimore Sun commented on this development for economics in 1892:
"Political economy has come to mean a group of sciences. Formerly it was supposed that any person of ordinary intelligence could teach political economy. . . Now it requires a combination of specialists to present the results of the most recent researches in every department of economics." 5 Already at this time there was a tension in the economics profession between those who saw social and ethical issues that defied formal analysis and those who emphasized pure economic theory. In 1889, Edwin R. A. Seligman, then an adjunct professor of political economy at Columbia University, commented on the tension between the "old school" that used a "historical and comparative method," and the "new school" that stressed an "a priori natural-law method"
and "abstract reasoning".
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Seligman suggested that adherents of the "new school" tended to be younger, and that it was the older economists who were more philosophically inclined. Interestingly, this observation might be made by some about economists today. Perhaps there is indeed something about insights gained with aging, insights which transcend the era in which one lives.
The long trend toward a greater sense of scientific discipline did not always result in narrow specialization. By 1916, one observer, Harvard philosopher Ralph Barton Perry, remarked at how a broader vision of human nature had been creeping into economics:
"Economic theory has steadily grown more psychological. . . . There has been a steadily growing tendency, in theory at least, to go behind the existing forms and instruments of the economic process, to the human motives which underlie and animate the process." 7 Indeed, the emphasis of modern economics on representing human economic behavior in terms of maximization of utility functions in the face of constraints was a triumph for a broader more humanistic view of economic processes, in that it saw people and their motives as the core of economic theory, and led to the development of welfare economics, which gave a better moral connection to economic analysis.
But, in the view of critics, the technical specialization of fields in economics became more prominent in the late twentieth century, when such innovations as rational expectations theory and the efficient markets hypothesis seemed to be carried to excess by their enthusiasts. "It is a little surprising that serious alternatives to rational expectations have never really been proposed. My original paper was largely a reaction against very naïve expectations hypotheses juxtaposed with highly rational decisionmaking behavior and seems to have been rather widely misinterpreted.
Two directions seem to be worth exploring: (1) explaining why "smoothing" rules work and their limitations and (2) incorporating well-known cognitive biases in an expectations theory (Kahneman & Tversky). It is really incredible that too little has been done along these lines." Heilbroner expressed concern about an increasing focus on economics being a "science," comparable to physics or biology, which seeks to discover laws governing economic events.
However, Heilbroner cited Alfred Marshall's warning that "economics cannot be compared with the exact physical sciences, for it deals with the ever-changing and subtle forces of human nature."
9 In addition, Heilbroner noted that economics cannot be a pure science because the social life of humans is inherently political.
III. Economics as a Moral Science
In recent years, the first use of the term "economics as a moral science" appears to date We cannot escape the proposition that as science moves from pure knowledge toward control, that is, toward creating what it knows, what it creates becomes a problem of ethical choice, and will depend upon the common values of the societies in which the scientific subculture is embedded, as well as of the scientific subculture. Under these circumstances science cannot proceed at all without at least an implicit ethic, that is, a subculture with appropriate common values.
10
Boulding singled out in his 1968 address a direction that often carries economists too far:
the fascination that economists have with the Pareto improvement as a framework for policy analysis. It seems self-evident to many economists that economic science should adopt the Pareto criterion as a research discipline: We should pursue the development of policies that make every single person better off, and cast aside any policy as unworthy of our consideration if it makes anyone worse off. But, Boulding argued, the underlying assumption that motivates Pareto theorizing, that people care only about themselves and that there is neither malevolence nor benevolence anywhere in the system, is demonstrably false. "Anything less descriptive of the human condition could hardly be imagined" 11 Boulding asserted.
Here, Boulding is asserting that one must understand "the human condition" in order to pursue economics as a moral science. In his view, this requires economists to have some knowledge about history and the broader social sciences, in addition to developing mathematical and technical skills. If we are not going to rely exclusively on a narrowly defined Pareto criterion, we need to have some sense of the interconnectedness of people, and of their emotional reactions and motivations.
IV. Promoting Economics as a Moral Science
After the apparent failure of economists to see the possibility of our recent financial crisis, there are emerging signs of greater interest in a balance between specialization and 10 Boulding (1969) Sinai about the alleged speculative bubble in the housing market, though it reached a weak conclusion that "it is impossible to state definitively whether a housing bubble exists." 13 The winter 2005 issue included a symposium on sociology and economics that set the stage for a discussion of the sociology of the current speculative situation in the markets, though it did not actually do this.
These scholars clearly saw elements of the crisis but did not put all the elements together to alert the reader that a crisis was imminent. Did these authors really not anticipate the crisis at all, or did their view of themselves as just specialized model builders make them hesitant to use their own best judgment to challenge the prevailing viewpoint that our financial system was solid? Clearly, not all of the problems of specialization were solved by the founding of this journal.
But the kind of effort exemplified by the Journal of Economic Perspectives to encourage professional economists to synthesize from a wide variety of research directions and to form judgments about the pressing issues of the day is the right direction to go. We simply must implement more changes, such as other interdisciplinary forums, and improved design of incentives for researchers, both in their training and in their subsequent careers. The real imperative for researchers is that efforts need to be redoubled to encourage cross-fertilization and broad-spectrum thinking, driven by the broad moral purpose of improving human welfare. 
